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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J.R. BAGNALL, aka, JOSEPH
R. BAGNALL, and FLORENCE
BAGNALL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
Case No. 13753

vs.
SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, an
Idaho Corporation,...UNITED
PAINT AND COLORS COMPANY,
et al.,
Defendant-Respondent,

PETITION FOR REHEARING

Comes now the Defendant-Respondent, United Paint &
Colors Company, by and through its attorney, Richard L. Maxfield, and
respectfully petitions the Court for a rehearing of the above-entitled
case as it applies to the Plaintiff-Appellants and the DefendantRespondent, United Paint & Colors Company.
Said Defendant-Respondent alleges the Court erred in
the following particulars:
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE
DEED MADE TO UTAH VALLEY LAND & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, WHEN IN
FACT SAID CORPORATION WAS INCORPORATED AS UTAH VALLEY LAND & DEVELOPMENT COMPANY.
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The affidavit of Jean B. Nyberg Shirk, filed herein
by the Plaintiffs, shows that on March 3, 1962, she executed a
Warranty Deed conveying a one-half interest in 140.15 acres to
Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation.

In said affidavit,

she states that at the time of executing the Deed, "...it was my
intent at the time I signed the Deed and handed it to Mr. Redmond,
that I was conveying the property to Utah Valley Land and Development
Corporation."
Within 20 days after the Deed was signed, a corporation
was formed in the name of Utah Valley Land and Development Company,
and when the corporation was formed, the Deed was given to its officers
by the promoter, who had possession of it.

Mrs. Shirk was paid a
i

valuable consideration for the Warranty Deed, and recognized thereafter
that she no longer held an equitable interest in said 140.15 acres.
The Corporation, after being formed, took the legal title to said
i
property, and years later in conveying the title to said property,
conveyed it out in the name of "Corporation", the same as received
which most persons believe to be synonymous with "Company".
The Courts have uniformly recognized that a deed is
to be construed in favor of vesting title and that a slight difference
in the spelling of a name is to be disregarded.
Carlson v. Lindauer, 259 P2d 925 (1953)-Calif.
A deed is to be construed in favor of vesting title...
The deed should be construed to give effect to the
intention of the grantor...It is not necessary that
a grantee in a deed be mentioned by name. If the
designation or description is sufficient to identify
the person or persons intended, the deed is effectual.
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Woodward v. McCollum, 111 NW 623 (1907)-ND
Language used in a~ieed of conveyance of real property,
as well as other contracts, should be given a commonsense interpretation, to the end that the evident
meaning and intention of the parties may be given
effect (at 625).
City Bank of Portage v. Plank, 124 NW 1000 (1910)Wisc. (In ascertaining the grantee) the real intention
of the parties is to be sought and effectuated by
courts.. .that intent may be effectuated by ascertaining
under proper rules of evidence the intention of the
parties, although such person (the grantee) be not
designated by his legal or usual name...If the court
can find that a certain person was intended as grantee,
it matters not what name is given him in the deed
(at 1001).
Hodgkiss v. Northern Petroleum Consol., 67 P2d
811, (1937)-Mont. A deed is sufficient if the grantee
can be identified by extrinsic evidence (at 814).
York v. Stone, 34 P2d 911 (1934)-Wash. A deed, in
order to pass title, must designate the grantee without
uncertainty, but it is not necessary that the grantee
be described by name, if otherwise identified or made
susceptible of identification by extrinsic evidence
(at 913).
Byrd v. Patterson, 48 Se2d 45, 229, N.C. 156 (1948)
While the correct name of the grantee affords a ready
means of identification of the person intended, its
use is not a prerequisite to the validity of the instrument. If a living or legal person is intended as the
grantee and is identifiable by the description used,
the deed is valid, however he may be named in the deed
(at 47).
Stainsby v. Schallenkamp, 34 NW2d 832 (1948) S.D.
If the deed in its entirety distinguishes the grantee
from the rest of the world it is sufficient (at 832,
quoting 26 C.J.S. Deeds Sec. 24b).
In dealing with grants to corporations, the Courts also
have uniformly held that the misnomer of a corporation as a grantee in
a deed is not sufficient to defeat the grant if the identity is manifest
and the corporation accepted the deed as delivered.
-3-
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Elbert v. Wilmington Turngemeinde, 107 A 215
(1919)-Delaware. In regard to mistake in setting out
the name in a deed, the rule is that if it can be
ascertained from the deed who is intended, the deed
is not vitiated by mistake. The misnomer of a corporation as grantee in a deed is not sufficient to defeat
the grant if the identity is manifest and the corporation accepted the deed as delivered. In the absence
of extrinsic circumstances, it is sufficient if the
grantee in the deed is expressed in the substance of
the name of the corporation (at 216-217).
Sumter Tobacco Warehouse Co. v. Phoenix Ins. Co. ,
Limited, of London, 56 SE 654 (S'.C. 1907), To hold
that the slight change in the name of the corporation
should defeat the deed would be to refuse to regard the
intention of the parties concerned for the sake of an
attenuated technicality.
Public Industrials Corporation v. Reading Hardware Co.,
29 F2d 975 (CCA 3rd) 1929. As a matter of law, the
authorities clearly show that a deed or mortgage is
valid although the corporate name as set forth is not
correct...An immaterial misnomer, as the ommission of
one word in the corporate name, will not render an
instrument invalid, where there was a proper authority
to execute it (at 976-last sentence is from Thompson on
Corp,, but no cite given).
The New York Court ruled directly on a case with almost
the identical facts situation as that before the Court at this time.
A deed was made to Falconer Realty Corporation prior to the corporation
being formed.

When the corporation was formed, the name was Falconer

Realty Company, Inc.

The Court held the deed to be valid and title

to be in the name of the corporation as formed.
Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Falconer Realty Corporation,
90 N.Y. 2d 345. It is conceded by the defendant, Buck,
that Falconer Realty Company, Inc. was, in truth and
in fact, intended to be the grantee named in the deed
which conveyed the premises to Falconer Realty Corporation. Such error upon the part of the scrivener of the
deed is readily understandable where, as here, Falconer
Realty Corporation was not in existence at the time of
such conveyance. Under these circumstances the title
is in Falconer Fealty Company, Inc., the intended grantee
(at 346).
-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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See also 19 C.J.S., Section 1093 at page 645:
If, in a conveyance to or for a corporation, it
can be ascertained from the deed who is intended
to take as grantee, the designation thereof will be
sufficient. A misnomer of a corporation as grantee
will not defeat the grant if the identity is established, and, particularly, if the deed is accepted by
the corporation...The courts will presume that the
words used were intended to be a description of,
rather than to express the accurate full name of,
the grantee; and this is specially so in the absence
of proof of the existence of a corporation having the
identical name used to describe the grantee in the
conveyance.

-5-
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POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THERE WAS A QUESTION OF
FACT TO BE DECIDED AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THE PLAINTIFFS HAD ACTUAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE CLAIMED INTEREST OF THE DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT, UNITED
PAINT AND COLOR COMPANY.
On page 6 of the Plaintiff-Respondent's Brief (which
has just come to the attention of the attorney for Defendant-Respondent), Plaintiffs1 attorney admits that the Plaintiffs had knowledge
of the claimed interest of the Defendant-Respondent, United Paint &
Colors Company, when he states as follows:
In any event, the modification agreement was
prepared by Mr, Tibbs, who had relied upon the
representations of Messrs. xMaxfield and Hughes
that Maxfield had acquired the outstanding interest
of Mrs. Nyberg, the outstanding interest of all
the other parties to the 1952 contract;...(J. R.
Bagnall - Direct; Florence Bagnall - Direct; Don V.
Tibbs - Direct and Cross).
Further on page 18 of Plaintiff-Respondentfs Brief,
Mr. Howard again recognizes that the Defendant-Respondent claimed
to have acquired Jean NybergTs interest when he states:
Contrary to the assertions of the appellants,
the question of marketable title was never a
point of issue since Maxfield represented to
Mr. Tibbs and to the sellers that he had acquired
all of the balance of the outstanding interest
of the parties. (Tr. 3, 23, 24, 27, 30, 31)
Relying on his own assertions, the modification
agreement of July 15, 1962 was made.
When we look at this testimony we see there is no
question but what the Bagnalls both knew of the claim of United
Paint and Colors Company to the 140.15 acres.

On page 3 of book 3

Df the transcript, at line 19 the testimony of Mr. Bagnall being
-6-
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questioned by Mr. Howard on direct examination is as follows:
Q.
Prior to this litigation did you have any
reason to believe that Mr. Maxfield hadn't acquired
all of the outstanding interests?
A.
I had no reason to believe that he hadn't.
I took his word on it.
Further in book 3 of the transcript at page 29 line 14
the question was asked by Mr. Howard of Mrs. Bagnall on direct examination:
Q.
When was it that you met Mr. Maxfield in Mr.
Tibbs' office?
A.

Near July 16, 1962.

Then continuing on that page, line 28:
Q.
Well, will you relate to the Jury, to the Court
the circumstances and conversations that took place on
that meeting date?
A.
Well, we were surprised to see Mr. Maxfield and
his attorney and his father. And he told us that they
had possession of the ranch.
MR. LORD: Your Honor, I!d ask that she
specify who's talking rather than just !TtheyT!.
A.
Mr. Maxfield said he had possession of the ranch,
he had moved his family on it, and he owned all of the
outstanding interests in it, and that we — we could
accept him there as a buyer or else.
Then on line 29, page 30 the Plaintiff, Mrs. Bagnall,
was asked:
Q.
Was anything said about where he was living at
the time?
A.

He was living on the ranch.

Q.

What did he say about it?

A.
Well, he said he had possession and that he owned
all the interests from other parties and that he was
going to stay there.
Q.
Was anything said about the nature of your interests?
Did he describe it for you?
A.

No.

Mr.. Tibbs, I think, did that for us.
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Then on the cross examination of Mr. Bagnall, book 2,
page 23, line 10, the question was asked:
Q.
Did you make any statement concerning the onehalf interest in the hundred and 40 acres which Jean
Nyberg owned?
A.
I think that we did, but, on the other hand,
we were not allowed to discuss that. Mr. Maxfield,
when he came in, I asked him if he said -Q.

Well, my question was -MR. HOWARD:

Let him answer.

A.
He said, M I own all of this —
up all of these interests,M

I've gathered

Then again on the cross examination of Mr. Bagnall,
book 2, at page 24, line 11, by Mr. Lord:
Q.
How did you purport in your understanding — I'm
not asking you the legal implications, but from your
understanding of the title, how could you feel you
could transfer a warranty deed, sign a warranty deed
conveying marketable title to that hundred and 40
acre tract when you only had a half interest in it?
A.
If the titles were merging, it would be entirely
possible -Then on the same page at line 22, he continued:
A.
Not only that, but it would be a sensible approach
to it. Mr. Maxfield had represented to me that he had
all of the outstanding titles, I had bought all of them,
and I own them, I have deeds for them. If he had that,
why should I have to transfer the hundred and 40 point
15, which have I too had been deeded to my sister,
Jean, in 1952, and the other half interest to myself.
For the Bagnalls to testify in Court that Mr. Maxfield
had told them in 1962 that he'd picked up all the outstanding interests
in the property, and Mr. Bagnall to testify that he only had a one-half
interest in the property and that he felt that Mr. Maxfield's one-half
interest in the property which had been acquired from Jean Nyberg
-8Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would merge with his, is completely contrary to the Affidavit which
the Plaintiffs now ask the Court to accept.

The Plaintiffs, in order

to win their main case on marketable title, testified that Mr. Maxfield
told them in 1962 that he had acquired Jean NybergTs interest.

Later

in order to win their case on the 140.15 acres they made an affidavit
that in 1971 (9 years later) they were not aware nor did they have
notice that Jean Nyberg had conveyed or attempted to convey her
interest in said property.

Their affidavit is completely contrary

to their testimony at the trial and that given in the deposition of
Mr. Bagnall prior to the pre-trial.
In considering the affidavit of the Bagnalls, and
whether or not they had knowledge of the claimed interests of the
Defendant-Respondent, Judge Harding was appraised of the fact that
Mr. Maxfield was in possession of the property, that he had been in
possession since 1962, that he claimed to hold possession under color
of title, and that he claimed to have acquired all of the other outstanding interests in the property other than the Bagnalls.

Possession

has always been recognized as notice.
Further, when Judge Harding granted the Defendants
Motion for Summary Judgment he was familiar with the deposition of
Mr. Bagnall which had been given in April of 1972,

In the deposition

at page 72, lines 16-19, he testified that he had been told that his
sister, Jean Nyberg Shirk, had sold her one-half interest in the
140,15 acres.

Judge Harding had read this deposition, and had spent

more than 40 hours in pre-trial where many of these matters were
brought to the attention of the Court although they were not reported
and made a part of the transcript.

At the pre-trial where the Defen-

dants Motion for Summary Judgment was granted, both of the Plaintiffs
-9-
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were present.

When the question arose as to what If any consideration

the Bagnalls had given Jean Nyberg Shirk for the Quitclaim Deed to
some 25 parcels of property, Judge Harding remarked, "Well, they're
here, letfs ask them."

And so the Bagnalls were asked at that time

what, if any, consideration they had paid Mrs. Jean Nyberg Shirk for
the property.

Mr. Bagnall replied, after some hesitation, that he

had forgiven Jean of her obligations under the contract.

It was

recognized that she had no obligations under the contract, so in fact,
she received no consideration at all for the Quitclaim Deed.
It is here suggested that Judge Harding, at the pre-trial,
recognized a fact of human nature, although it was not so expressed:
The Bagnalls, realizing that Jean Nyberg Shirk had good title to onehalf of the 140.15 acres of ground which was worth several thousands
of dollars, would not have requested her to deed the property to
them for what in effect amounted to nothing as consideration, had
they not known that she had previously deeded out her interest in the
property and really had nothing of value to convey to them.

Further,

llrs. Shirk would not have deeded the property to the Bagnalls without
receiving a substantial sum of money, except for the fact that she had
sold her interest in the 140.15 acres to Utah Valley Land and Developlent Corporation, had given a Warranty Deed to the property, and
;herefore felt she had no further interest in the property.
Furthermore, the Bagnalls were educated, professional
eople, familiar with real estate transactions.

Particularly Mrs.

agnail, who testified on cross examination at the trial that she had
orked for ten years in California as a licensed real estate agent.
Book 2, page 156, lines 20-22).

She further testified that she wrote

ontracts, established escrows, showed properties, and had knowledge
-10Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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of the necessity of conveying good title and evidence of ownership.
(Book 2, page 157, lines 3-19).
On May 8, 1974, after the plaintiffs! case had been tried
and Judge Harding had heard all of the evidence, the plaintiffs filed
a motion to vacate the Summary Judgment awarded in favor of the
defendant, United Paint & Color Company.
Said Motion came on regularly for hearing before Judge
Harding on June 25, 1974 at Provo, Utah.

The question of notice,

possession and other matters were duly argued before the Court
by plaintiffs1 attorneys, Jackson B. Howard and Ronald Brent Boutwell.
Judge Harding being very familiar with all of the evidence introduced
at the trial, all of the motions and other pleadings filed before
and after the trial, and all of the pre-trials that had been held, carefully reviewed the Summary Judgment granted defendant, United Paint
and Color Company, and then denied plaintiffs1 Motion and ordered
the Summary Judgment to stand.
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CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the Court erred
in remanding the case between the Plaintiffs and United Paint & Colors
Company for a new trial.
From the cases cited, and the facts of this case,
there should be no question but what the Warranty Deed from Jean
Nyberg Shirk to Utah Valley Land and Development Corporation was a
valid conveyance for a valuable consideration, and that the legal and
equitable interest to one-half of the 140.15 acres was held by the
Defendant-Respondent, United Paint & Colors Company.
Further, the evidence before the Court, the Plaintiffs'
own brief, testimony, and other facts before the Court, clearly show
that the Plaintiffs had knowledge of the Defendant-Respondent, United
Paint & Color Company's interest in said property.
Based on the foregoing, Defendant-Respondent, respectfully
requests a rehearing before the Court, and upon said rehearing, the
Trial Court's Order granting Summary Judgment be affirmed.
Resp^ttfujly requested,

MAXFIELD, GAMMON, ELLIS & DALEBOUT
28 North 100 East, P. 0. Box 1097
Provo, Utah
84601
Attorney for United Paint & Colors
Company, Defendant-Respondent
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